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Abstract
The article uses Zeno's metrical paradox of extension, or Zeno's fundamental paradox, as a
thought-model for the mind-body problem. With the help of this model, the distinction contained
between mental and physical phenomena can be formulated as sharply as possible. I formulate (I) Zeno's
fundamental paradox and give a sketch of four different solutions to it. Then (II) I construct a
mind-body paradox corresponding to the fundamental paradox. Through that, it becomes possible (III)
to copy the solutions to the fundamental paradox on the mind-body paradox. Three of them fail. But
(IV) one of them — the Aristotelian one — gives us an interesting hint. Finally, (V) this hint is pursued
somewhat further and (VI) through comparison with Zeno's fundamental paradox, the impossibility of a
solution to the mind-body problem is shown again. The main new point of this article is the comparison
of the mind-body problem with Zeno's fundamental paradox. The article is a revised version of an article
published in: Méthexis, Revista Internacional de Filosofia Antigua/International Journal for Ancient
Philosophy, 13, 2000, 139-151.
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Livio Rossetti, whose friendship I have had the pleasure and privi-lege to share since my first encounter with him in Perugia in the 
Piazza Ermini on the occasion of the Second Symposium Platonicum in 
September 1989, has for a long time had an interest in Zeno.1 His main 
interest is, so it seems to me, mainly the rhetoric of these paradoxes, 
especially the rhetoric of the four paradoxes on motion. I am more in-
terested in the logical aspects, which I want to pursue here. Now these 
paradoxes have a kind of wit, but nevertheless they have a wit that has 
its own profundity. This is especially the case when we regard these four 
paradoxes as a witty expression of a more profound paradox that un-
derlies them. I have called this “Zeno’s fundamental paradox”, namely, 
that an extended line consists of unextended points. But we can apply 
this paradox to another problem, namely, the mind-body problem. In 
the following article, I try to reformulate this problem with the help of 
Zeno.
The mind-body problem as it arose with Descartes may be formu-
lated with the following three propositions:2 
(a) Mental phenomena are non-physical phenomena.
(b) Mental phenomena interact with physical ones.
(c) The physical world is causally closed.
1. Cf. Rossetti 1988, 1992, 1993, 1994. 
2. I am following here, with small modifications, the helpful exposition of P. BieRi, 
Analytische Philosophie des Geistes, Königstein 21993, pp. 5-7. 
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These three propositions form together a trilemma, because they all 
seem prima facie evident, although we cannot accept them all together. 
Two of them imply the falsehood of a third: If (a) mental phenomena 
are non-physical phenomena and (b) nevertheless interact with physi-
cal ones then (c) the physical world is not causally closed. But if (c) the 
physical world is causally closed and (a) mental phenomena are non-
physical, then (b) interaction between physical and mental phenomena 
is not possible. But if despite the (c) causal closure of the physical world, 
we have (b) interaction between physical and non-physical phenomena, 
then (a) mental phenomena are no longer non-physical.
I use now Zeno’s metrical paradox of extension, or Zeno’s funda-
mental paradox, as a thought model for the mind-body problem. With 
the help of this paradox, the distinction contained in thesis (a) between 
mental and physical phenomena can be formulated as sharply as pos-
sible.3 I formulate (I) the above-mentioned paradox and give a sketch of 
four different answers to it. Then (II) I construe a mind-body paradox 
corresponding to the fundamental paradox. Through that, it becomes 
possible (III) to copy the solutions to the fundamental paradox onto 
the mind-body paradox. Three of them fail. But (IV) one of them — the 
Aristotelian one — gives us an interesting hint. Finally, (V) this hint 
should be pursued somewhat further, and (VI) through the comparison 
with Zeno’s fundamental paradox, the logical impossibility of a solution 
to the mind-body problem shall be shown again. 
I
What I call Zeno’s metrical paradox of extension, or Zeno’s funda-
mental paradox, is the conjunction of two propositions: (a) A point in 
space or time is indivisible and without extension. (b) A line in space or 
time is continuous and extended. 
Since, however, an extended line in space or time is supposed to 
consist of infinitely many unextended points in space or time, the two 
propositions exclude each other: If (a) is true, then (b) is false. If (b) is 
true, then (a) is false. This paradox is fundamental because it under-
lies, in my opinion, all the other four paradoxes of motion: the Runner, 
3. I am indebted for this idea to K. Bächi.
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Achilles and the Tortoise, the Arrow and the Stadium (cf. FeRBeR 1995, 
esp. pp. 50-52).4
But the two propositions exclude each other only prima facie. In fact, 
there are at least four answers to this fundamental paradox, which I will 
outline now in a brief survey (cf. FeRBeR 1995, pp. 102-103).
(1) Aristotle solves the paradox by his theory of the continuum, 
whose nucleus may be sketched for our purpose in the following way: 
If the presupposed set of points is dense, there is a sense in which the 
predicate “divisible everywhere” applies to quantities and a sense in 
which it does not. It does not belong to them insofar as the set of points 
is not divisible everywhere simultaneously. It belongs to them insofar 
as it is divisible at any point, but not simultaneously. Only simultaneous 
divisibility at all points leads to the fact that a magnitude may be di-
vided into nothing. Divisibility at any point leads only to a division into 
smaller and smaller parts (cf. De gen. et. corr. A2. 317 a 2-17). When we 
presuppose the second sense, we do not arrive at a paradox. A line does 
not actually consist of points because points are only potential cuts in 
the line (cf. Phys. Δ13. 222 a 14). 
(2) Infinitesimal calculus solves the paradox by the method of ap-
proaching a limit. In differential calculus, the transition from an ex-
tended line to an unextended point is made possible by postulating the 
limit of a line that becomes infinitely small. In integral calculus, a line 
is described as the sum of an infinite number of infinitely small sum-
mands. This sum may be described, in turn, as a limit that can take the 
value of a positive number.
(3) Cantor’s theory of the continuum solves the paradox insofar 
as a non-denumerable infinite set of extensionless points may be de-
scribed as a non-denumerable infinite set of degenerate subintervals. 
Since a finite interval (a, b) is the union of a continuum of degener-
ate subintervals, “we cannot meaningfully determine its length in 
our theory by ‘adding’ the individual zero lengths of the degenerate 
4. Unfortunately, the article of Davey 2007, p. 127, does not take into account my 
interpretation of the Stadium. Thus, it lags behind the current state of research as does 
the article of Huggett 2004.
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subintervals” (gRünBaum 1968, p. 136). We are here confronted with 
an instance in which “set-theoretic addition (i.e., forming the union of 
degenerate subintervals) is meaningful”, “while arithmetic addition (of 
their lengths) is not” (gRünBaum 1968, p. 136). Cantor’s theory does not 
assign any meaning to ‘forming the arithmetic sum’, when we are at-
tempting to ‘sum’ a super-denumerable infinity of individual numbers 
(lengths)! (gRünBaum, 1968, p. 135). 
(4) A dissolution of the paradox goes back to the theory of “indivis-
ible lines” assigned to Plato by Aristotle (cf. Metaph. A9. 992 a 20-22). 
Whereas, however, attempts (1) to (3) still try to solve Zeno’s funda-
mental paradox, the problem does not even appear anymore within the 
theory of the “indivisible lines”: it dissolves “like a piece of sugar in 
water”, to use an expression of L. Wittgenstein made in another context 
(Wittgenstein 1989, p. 192). For, unlike the propositions (a) “A point 
in space or time is indivisible and without extension” and (b) “A line 
in space or time is continuous and extended”, the propositions (a’) “A 
point in space or time is an atomic, finite unity of space and time” and 
(b’) “A line in space or time is an extended discontinuum of space or 
time” don’t exclude each other, but form a biconditional. Instead of “If 
(a) is true, then (b) is false. If (b) is true, then (a) is false”, we get If (a’) 
is true, then (b’) is true. If (b’) is true, then (a’) is true (cf. FeRBeR, 1995, 
50-74).
II
For Descartes, according to the above-mentioned trilemma, (a) the 
mind or the res cogitans is in contrast to the body as res extensa unex-
tended, but nevertheless (b) interacts with the body, despite the fact (c) 
that for Descartes nature is causally closed. In fact, the laws of push are 
confined to the corporeal world (Principles of Philosophy, part 2, § 40). 
Now if we apply Zeno’s fundamental paradox to proposition (a) of the 
above-mentioned trilemma, we obtain the following: 
(a) An idea, a unit or “point of consciousness”, is unextended [in space].
(b) A body is extended [in space]. 
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But, contrary to Zeno’s fundamental paradox, the unity of brain and 
consciousness does not consist in the paradoxical unity of the addition 
of unextended points to an extended line, but in the paradoxical unity 
of interaction between unextended points of consciousness and an ex-
tended body. Whereas the addition of unextended points to an extend-
ed line appears to be conceptually impossible, the interaction between 
unextended points and an extended body is impossible in reality. The 
apparent conceptual impossibility of the addition can be mastered by 
the infinitesimal calculus and Cantor’s continuum theory, but the real 
impossibility cannot be resolved in a similar way. For, according to the 
laws of conservation of matter and energy, the physical world is caus-
ally closed. Hence, no non-physical cause such as an unextended point 
of consciousness can interact with a body. Therefore, the human being 
that in Descartes’ conception is a substantial unity of body and mind, 
or brain and consciousness, embraces a relation of interaction between 
two entities that cannot enter into such a relation. In analogy to Zeno’s 
fundamental paradox, the two propositions (a) and (b) exclude each 
other. If (a) is true, then (b ) is false. If (b) is true, then (a) is false.
Hereafter, I will borrow an expression from J.C. Eccles and name 
these points of consciousness psychons and the parts of the brain that 
are linked to them dendrons. I further assume with J.C. Eccles “that 
each of these psychons is reciprocally linked in some unique manner 
to its dendron” (eccles 1994, p. 87; cf. also eccles 1994, figure 6.10). 
Now, just as an extended line cannot be summed up from unextended 
points, likewise the human brain cannot form a unity of unextended 
psychons and extended dendrons. Regardless of how many dendrons 
we may discover, they cannot produce a single psychon. Regardless of 
how many psychons we may find, they are not able to bring about a 
single change in a single dendron. Of course, as is well known, indefi-
nitely small causes may have indefinitely big effects. The beatings of the 
wings of a jackdaw may start an avalanche and those of a butterfly in 
China may produce a hurricane in Mexico. But according to the above-
mentioned presupposition, no psychon can cause a transmitter to pour 
a chemical substance into a dendron, since a psychon is not only infi-
nitely small, but unextended. Therefore, the interaction between brain 
and consciousness is paradoxical. In analogy to Zeno’s fundamental 
paradox, I am calling this paradox the mind-body paradox. More than 
Zeno’s paradox, this second paradox seems to be unsolvable for logical 
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reasons, so that long before Colin McGinn’s thesis of the cognitive clo-
sure of the human mind (mcginn 1991, pp. 2-3),5 we can read in Pascal: 
“The way in which minds are linked to bodies cannot be understood 
by human beings, nevertheless this is the human being” (Thoughts, § 
72-199).6
III
Now Zeno’s paradoxes are taking place in our thoughts, not in real-
ity. We all suppose that in reality Achilles overtakes the tortoise. Like-
wise, we assume that the body and consciousness interact with each 
other. But how this is possible is just the philosophical problem. Let us 
therefore copy the four above-mentioned answers on the mind-body 
paradox. 
We begin with the fourth one (4) (cf. p. 4) and assume in the sense 
of a logical possibility that these “points of consciousness” or psychons 
may be analysed in a future state of neurophysiologic research. These 
points themselves would be measurable by the elementary space and 
time units. Then we obtain the following propositions:
(a’) A psychon has an extension.
(b’) A dendron has an extension.
Herewith the mind-body paradox would disappear. For if the human 
being forms a unity of brain and consciousness, the two propositions 
(a’) and (b’) do not exclude each other. Rather, they explain how the 
interaction between psychons and dendrons is possible. For these two 
5. For mcginn 1991, pp. 2-3, we have a mind-body problem, “because we are cut off by 
our very cognitive constitution from achieving a conception of that natural property of the 
brain (or of consciousness) that accounts for the psychophysical link”. 
6. “Modus quo corporibus adhaerent spiritus comprehendi ab hominibus non potest, 
et hoc tamen homo est.” Pascal borrows this statement from Augustine: “quia et iste alius 
modus, quo corporibus adhaerent spiritus et animalia fiunt, omnino mirus est nec com-
prehendi ab hominibus potest, et hoc ipse homo est” (City of God, book 21, section 10). 
Cf. also Hume’s Enquiry, Sect. VII, Part II, 74: “The same difficulty occurs in contemplat-
ing the operations of mind on body—where we observe the motion of the latter to follow 
upon the volition of the former, but are not able to observe or conceive the tie which binds 
together the motion and volition, or the energy by which the mind produces this effect”. 
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entities — the psychon and the dendron — are both of a physicalistic 
nature. Between them an interaction, on the one hand, is conceptually 
possible, and on the other hand does not violate the laws of conserva-
tion.
But it is evident that, in contrast to Zeno’s fundamental paradox, 
such a solution does not make the mind-body paradox disappear, but 
only contests what it should explain. For in contrast to such elementary 
physical points, psychons are not measurable and qualitative. Hence, it 
makes no sense to say that a psychon or a point of consciousness is so 
and so small. On the other hand, we may with Th. Nagel’s well-known 
question What Is it Like to Be a Bat? (nagel 1974, pp. 435-450) in-
quire what it is like for me to have psychons, but not what it is like for 
me to have dendrons. But as long as we do not take these qualia into 
consideration, “we cannot even pose the mind-body problem without 
sidestepping it” (nagel 1974, p. 450). It is a merit of Colin McGinn to 
have again made clear that qualia don’t have any spatial dimensionality 
and to have restored this Cartesian intuition (cf. mcginn 1995, pp. 220-
230).7
However, a solution that (2) is based on the differential or integral 
calculus would save the unextendedness of the psychons. It may be logi-
cally possible to calculate psychons in such a way that they are limiting 
cases of dendrons and as such unextended. Then we obtain the follow-
ing propositions: 
(a’’) A psychon is the limiting case of the extension of a dendron.
(b’’’) A dendron is extended.
These two propositions, too, do not contradict each other. But the 
particular character of the psychons, namely, the fact that they are giv-
en to us from an inner perspective, would disappear. Nobody so far ever 
saw an unextended point with his bodily eyes or felt it in his inner per-
ception. Rather, it is the (Fregean) sense of the expression “unextended 
point” that becomes the reference. In this (ordinary) sense, unextended 
points have no real existence, but only a theoretical or, more exactly, a 
7. “E [e.g. the visual experience of lightning] seems not to have any of these spatial 
characteristics: it is not located at any specific place; it takes up no particular volume of 
space; it has no shape; it is not made up of spatially distributed parts; it has no spatial 
dimensionality; it is not solid”, p. 220.
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nominal or semantic one (cf. FeRBeR 82008, pp. 136-142; 2009, pp. 114-
121). But if psychons have only a semantic existence, then they lose 
their real character, namely, that it is for me in some way to have such 
psychons. In addition to this, the interaction between psychons and 
dendrons could no longer be explained, since limiting cases with zero 
extension also have zero causality.
Something similar is true (3) for Cantor’s theory of continuum. Ac-
cording to this, we obtain again, in the sense of a logical possibility, the 
following propositions:
(a’’’’) A psychon is the “degenerated subinterval” of the extension of a dendron.
(b’’’) A dendron is extended.
But even if neurophysiologists would be able to copy unextended 
psychons on a mathematical continuum in Cantor’s sense, the problem 
would nevertheless not yet be solved. We can feel psychons, but not 
Cantor’s sets. Moreover, it is impossible that “degenerated subinter-
vals” can interact with dendrons. Therefore, Cantor’s solution also does 
not do justice to the phenomenon of psychons. For contrary to Zeno’s 
fundamental paradox, which is based upon an apparent contradiction 
between the zero dimensionality of points that can only be posited theo-
retically and the extension of a line that can be experienced empirically, 
the mind-body paradox rests on a contradiction between the extension 
of dendrons and the zero dimensionality of psychons, which are both 
perceptible, the one through our outer perception, the others through 
our inner one.
Thus the physicalistic (4) and the nominalistic [(2) and (3)] solu-
tions—nominalistic in the sense of a psychological nominalism—do not 
lead to a viable solution of the mind-body paradox. Both positions, the 
physicalistic and the nominalistic ones, are reductionist in an unsuit-
able sense, since they deny a part of the problem: For the physicalis-
tic position, there are no (spatially) unextended qualitative “points of 
consciousness”; for the nominalistic positions, it is true that there are 
unextended points, but they would not have real, but only semantic ex-
istence.
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IV
Hence, of the four answers to Zeno’s fundamental paradox, only (1) 
the Aristotelian one remains. To prevent a misunderstanding, let us 
mention here that Aristotle’s solution of Zeno’s fundamental paradox is 
not intended by him to also be the solution of the mind-body problem. 
I don’t want to discuss here Aristotle’s solution of this problem and its 
credibility in the framework of functionalism (cf. gRangeR 1990, pp. 27-
49; BuRnyeat 1992, pp. 15-26; Patzig 2009, pp. 249-266). Since Aristo-
tle did not yet know the laws of conservation of matter (and energy), 
the mind-body problem did not arise for him with the sharpness with 
which the problem has been raised since Descartes. Here I only want to 
ask the question of whether Aristotle’s solution of Zeno’s fundamental 
paradox can be transferred in an illuminating way to the mind-body 
paradox as exposed.
In transferring this solution, there exist in reality only dendrons, 
i.e., extended bodies. In thoughts, however, we can understand unex-
tended psychons as limits of dendrons that confer a potential existence 
to the psychons. Thus, the unextended psychons exist no more actually 
or independently in dendrons than the unextended spatial points in a 
line exist actually or independently. Psychons exist only potentially in 
dendrons, just as unextended points exist only potentially in a line. The 
ontological status of the psychons can be described in the same way in 
which Aristotle characterised the potentiality of the infinite. The spe-
cialness of the potential existence of the infinite consists in the fact that 
it does not presuppose actuality, neither conceptually nor according to 
time nor according to essence (cf. Metaph. Q8. 1049 b 4-1051 a 3). For 
the infinite “does not exist potentially in the sense that it will ever ac-
tually have separate existence; its separateness is only in knowledge” 
(Metaph. Q6. 1048 b 14-15, tr. Ross-Barnes). Thus unextended points 
in a line, too, do not exist independently in the line and do not presup-
pose real points. Rather, they exist only in thought. In order to distin-
guish between the potentiality that presupposes actuality from the one 
that does not, we will put the second one into quotation marks.
In an analogous way, psychons do not exist actually and independ-
ently in dendrons, but only “potentially” (or in thoughts). Thus the indi-
visibility or unextendedness of the psychons is not a product of reality, 
but of cognition. Now, just as the unextended psychons exist only in 
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cognition, likewise also their qualitative character. We will characterise 
this potential existence and the “unique way in which each psychon is 
linked to a dendron” (eccles, 1994, 87) in such a way that psychons are 
the way in which dendrons are given to us in immediate awareness. Ac-
cording to this, we obtain the following propositions:
(a’’’) A psychon is the way in which a dendron
is given to us in immediate awareness.
(b’’’’) A dendron is extended.
These two propositions do not contradict each other. For a dendron 
may very well be extended, but nevertheless be given to us in our cog-
nition in an unextended and qualitative way. Such a hypothesis rec-
ognizes (a’’’’) the psychic and (b’’’’) the physical side of the mind-body 
problem and conforms to proposition (a) “Mental phenomena are non-
physical phenomena”. Likewise, we also obtain an answer to the ques-
tion about how the causal role of psychons can be explained. On the one 
hand, as entities that exist only in thoughts, they cannot interact with 
dendrons. This is impossible for the above-mentioned conceptual and 
factual reasons. We thus not only, to quote from K. Popper’s dialogue 
with J.C. Eccles, have to assume that “the first law of thermodynamics 
can no longer be checked; and there is thus no real reason to say that it 
has been violated” (PoPPeR 1977, p. 563—Part 3, dialogue 12, September 
30). We have also to assume that a point of zero dimensions has zero 
causality. If we may, with D. Hume, characterise the relation of causal-
ity between A and B by contiguity, succession and the impression of 
necessary connection, it is even impossible to understand how an un-
extended psychon can enter into a relation of contiguity.8 On the other 
hand, the physical activity of dendrons is nevertheless, in our direct 
cognition, phenomenally given to us in such a way that, probably be-
cause of long accustomization, we experience it as causal effectiveness. 
As we may suppose since D. Hume’s analysis of causality, the causal 
relation between two events is not given in rerum natura, but is a con-
nection merely in our cognition: “When we say therefore that one object 
is connected with another, we mean only that they have acquired a con-
8. Cf. lucRetius, De rerum natura, 1, 304: “tangere enim et tangi, nisi corpus, nulla 
potest res”.
305Zeno’s Metrical Paradox of Extension and Descartes’ Mind-Body Problem
nexion in our thought and give rise to this inference” (Hume, Enquiry, 
Section 7, Part 2, 76). Likewise, the relation of causality between psy-
chons and dendrons is a connection merely in our thought. But only the 
dendrons can do the job of “selecting by means of the quantal probabil-
ity field, a vesicle for exocytosis” (cf. the hypothetical model of eccles, 
1994, chapt. 5). But the relation of causality does not lie in the dendrons 
themselves, but is given phenomenally in the form of psychons, even 
if, without dendrons, psychons cannot become effective. Thus in the 
mind-body paradox, we maintain the propositions (a) “Mental phe-
nomena are non-physical phenomena” and (c) “The physical world is 
“causally closed”, but we must give up (b) “Mental phenomena interact 
with physical ones”. This interaction is possible neither physically nor 
logically, but is an inevitable illusion.
V
Let us now go back to Zeno’s paradoxes. It is evident that Achilles 
overtakes the tortoise. But when we start to philosophise, the ques-
tion arises as to how this is possible. Yet, it is only in thought that 
the tortoise has a lead. Likewise, only in our thoughts is the mind a 
step in advance of our conception. In practical life, there is no prob-
lem concerning the interaction of psychons and dendrons, mind and 
body. As long as we are not paralysed, we can move an arm in ac-
cordance with our will. Only when we start to philosophise does the 
question arise as to how such an interaction is possible despite the 
conservation laws.
But it is a product of our thought that there is an interaction be-
tween psychons and dendrons. By conceiving psychons as the way in 
which dendrons are given in immediate cognition, we see how an in-
teraction is possible without violating the laws of conservation. For it is 
not psychons that are producing some effect in some mysterious way; 
it is dendrons that are unmysteriously producing it. But dendrons are 
given to us in direct cognition only under the aspect of psychons. Hence 
the real causality of dendrons is given to us as the spurious causality of 
psychons. In an analogous way, a line is extended in reality and cannot 
be made up of unextended parts. Based on the results of our analysis, 
we can reconstruct the line in such a manner that it is made up of unex-
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tended points, and with this we end up creating  the problem of how an 
extended line can be composed of unextended points.
This theory is an aspect dualism. Instead of conceiving mind and 
body as things whose reciprocal relation then becomes problematic, 
mind and body are only two different aspects of the same thing, as 
Spinoza formulated it: “Mind and body is one and the same individu-
al, which now is conceived under the attribute of thought, now under 
the one of extension” (Ethics, Part 2, and theorem 21, Annotation).9 By 
means of G. Frege’s distinction between sense and reference, aspect 
dualism may be formulated in such a way that the expressions den-
dron and psychon have different “senses” or “modes of presentation”, 
but the same reference. According to this, psychons are dendrons, but 
our mentalist language describes them in a way that cannot be copied 
isomorphically in a physiological and physicalistic terminology. Only 
in this sense are mental phenomena, according to the thesis (a) of the 
mind-body paradox, non-physical phenomena.
VI
Nevertheless, this must be made more precise. A line does not have 
the double “mode of presentation” of being on the one hand extended 
and on the other hand composed of an infinite number of points with-
out extension. An unextended line would no longer be a line. It only 
has the double aspect of being extended on the one hand and on the 
other of possessing in thought as many “potential” cuts or “limits” as 
you like. Likewise, the dendron does not have the double aspect of be-
ing extended and of being an unextended psychon. A dendron has only 
the double aspect of being given as an extended entity in indirect cogni-
tion and as an unextended psychon in immediate awareness. Now, just 
as a line is indeed extended on the one hand, but unextended only in a 
“potential” sense, so the dendron is indeed extended on the one hand, 
but an unextended psychon in the “potential” sense. In direct outer 
perception, sound waves appear to us as sounds and electromagnetic 
waves as colours, just as in the inner perception, dendrons appear to us 
9. “[…] Mentem et corpus unum, et idem esse individuum, quod jam sub Cogita-
tionis, jam sub Extensionis attributo concipitur”.
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as unextended psychons, e.g., as some elementary sensations. Insofar 
as aspect dualism is no more mysterious than that, an extended line has 
in the “potential” sense unextended parts.
But it is also true to say with T. Nagel: “To talk about a dual aspect 
theory is largely hand waving. It is only to say roughly where the truth 
might be located, not what it is” (nagel 1986, p. 31). Nevertheless, it is 
a misunderstanding of T. Nagel to say “that the brain has nonphysical 
properties” (ibid.), just as it is a misunderstanding of J.R. Searle’s “bio-
logical materialism” to assert that “consciousness” is “itself a feature of 
the brain” in the sense of an “emergent property”, like the liquidity of 
water is an emergent property of a system of molecules (seaRle 1997, 
pp. 17-18). The brain as a physical organ cannot possess non-physical or 
mental features, just as an extended line cannot have unextended points, 
except “potentially”. But the comparison with the line illustrates a for-
mulation of the mind-body problem in which the problem becomes un-
solvable, as has been asserted in various ways from Augustine through 
Pascal up to Th. Nagel and C. McGinn. Indeed, it is impossible for us to 
understand “how minds cling to bodies” (Pascal) or to achieve “a con-
ception of that natural property of the brain (or of consciousness) that 
accounts for the psychophysical link” (mcginn 1991, p. 2). But if “non-
physical features of the brain” are only the immediate “modes of repre-
sentation” or the “senses” of dendrons, then they are like points in the 
line thoughts. They “cling to bodies” or become “nonphysical features 
of the brain” only when we make sense of the reference, i.e., if we reify 
their “mode of representation” to “nonphysical features of the brain”. 
Similarly, unextended points in a line are only mental “cuts” that are 
reified. As soon as we forget this reification, the apparently unsolvable 
problem arises as to how an extended line can consist of unextended 
points. But as soon as we disregard this reification of psychons, the re-
ally unsolvable problem arises as to how an extended brain can pro-
duce such unextended mental points and how such unextended mental 
points can exert an effect on the extended brain.
T. Nagel is therefore right when he continues “[that] one must be 
careful to recognise that it [to talk about a dual aspect theory] doesn’t 
by itself increase our understanding any more than the postulation of a 
non-physical substance does. The main question, how anything in the 
world can have a subjective point of view remains unanswered” (nagel 
1986, p. 57). But probably this question is also asked in a misleading 
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way. Nothing in the material world can have per se a subjective point 
of view, just as the star Venus by herself doesn’t have the property to 
be the morning or the evening star, to use Frege’s well-known exam-
ple. Likewise, a dendron by itself doesn’t have the property of being a 
psychon. A subjective point of view is only characteristic of the way in 
which dendrons are experienced by us in immediate awareness and rei-
fied to psychons.
But unfortunately this is not the end of the story. The proposition, 
“A subjective point of view is the way in which the brain is given to us 
in immediate awareness” also has a circular structure. For in principle 
it means nothing other than, A subjective point of view is the way in 
which a brain is given to us from a subjective point of view. Yet here 
we come, on a higher level of reflection, to a point where one can only 
state circular propositions, since, to remain in the image of the line, we 
are ourselves the points in the line that we produce. But from where do 
these “points of consciousness” that we produce come from?
They, too, are facts of our immediate awareness that we have rei-
fied. But from where do these new facts come? The question may be 
repeated ad indefinitum. Here, at this indefinite autopoiesis of “points 
of consciousness” or indefinite capacity of reflection, consciousness is 
again and again somewhat in advance of our conceptual grasp. Just as 
an unextended “point of consciousness” cannot be naturalized, so, too, 
its indefinite intramental autopoiesis cannot. Rather, it appears that 
because of our biologically conditioned limits of cognition (cf. mcginn 
1993, esp. chapt. 2), we must simply accept this double aspect of real-
ity as the primitive psychophysical phenomenon and a mystery. Every 
attempt to dig further here would make us meet not with “hard rock”, 
but with psychons where “the spade of our thinking is turning back on 
itself”, to modify an image of L. Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investiga-
tions, § 217) in the context of the mind-body problem or paradox. In 
this sense reflection can really never overtake consciousness—as Achil-
les apparently could never overtake the tortoise.10
10. This is the revised and slightly shortened version of an article I published in 
«Méthexis, Revista internacional de filosofia Antigua/International Journal for Ancient 
Philosophy», 13, 2000, pp. 139-151.
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